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This Research for Policy is 
based on “Defining Law 
Enforcement’s Role in 
Protecting American 
Agriculture from Agroter­
rorism,” by Terry Knowles, 
James Lane, Gary Bayens, 
Nevil Speer, Jerry Jaax, 
David Carter, and Andra 
Bannister, final report to 
the National Institute of 
Justice, December 2005, 
NCJ 212280, available at 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/grants/212280.pdf. 
Agroterrorism— 

Why We’re Not Ready:

A Look at the Role of Law Enforcement 
The introduction of FMD in 
the United States—with its 
generally open and difficult-
to-protect farms, fields, and 
feedlots—would require the 
mass slaughter of animals 
and the disposal of potential­
ly millions of animal carcass­
es. It could halt the domestic 
and international sale of 
meat and meat products for 
months or even years. Based 
on the FMD outbreak in the 
United Kingdom in 2001, re­
searchers estimate that an 
attack against the American 
livestock industry could cost 
taxpayers up to $60 billion.1 
Who Would Lead 
the Response? 
Many believe that public 
health officials would lead the 
response to an agroterrorism 
attack, but this might not be 
the case. The laws of most 
States require that such an 
event be handled as a crime 
scene investigation, giving 
law enforcement primary 
responsibility. Ill-equipped 
to handle the magnitude of 
responsibilities that would 
Terrorists seeking to strike a 
blow at the U.S. economy 
need look no further than 
the Nation’s heartland for a 
“soft” target. An agroterrorist 
attack could dramatically im­
pact many aspects of Ameri­
can life, including local law 
enforcement, which— 
especially in rural areas—is 
financially and strategically 
unprepared to respond. 
Agricultural experts say that 
today they are most con­
cerned about the intentional 
introduction of foot-and­
mouth disease (FMD) into 
the food supply. Twenty 
times more infectious than 
smallpox, FMD causes pain­
ful blisters on the tongues, 
hooves, and teats of cloven-
hoofed animals (like cows, 
pigs, goats, and deer), ren­
dering them unable to walk, 
be milked, eat, and drink. 
Although people generally 
cannot contract FMD, they 
can carry the virus in their 
lungs up to 48 hours and 
transmit it to animals. The 
animal-to-animal airborne-
transmission range of FMD 
is 50 miles. 
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This 21-month study was 
conducted through a part­
nership among the Kansas 
Bureau of Investigation, 
the Ford County (Kansas) 
Sheriff’s Department, and 
the National Agriculture 
Biosecurity Center at 
Kansas State University; 
findings were based, in 
part, on field surveys and 
interviews with law 
enforcement, livestock 
producers, meat packers, 
truckers, feedlot 
managers, researchers, 
politicians, and animal 
health officials. The 
research also included 
two agroterrorist simula­
tion exercises in Kansas. 
follow an act of agroterror­
ism, local police departments 
would be pushed to the limit. 
Research points to the first 
priority of local law enforce­
ment after an agroterrorist 
attack: establishing and en­
forcing a 6-mile radius quar­
antine (113 square miles) 
around the point of origin 
to control the spread of the 
virus. The second priority 
would be to set up state­
wide roadblocks to enforce 
stop-movement orders. 
Such a tremendous effort— 
requiring that all vehicles 
coming into or going out 
of the impacted State be 
stopped and inspected— 
would require a coordinated 
response by local, State, 
and Federal officials. 
Evidence, including tissue 
from infected animals, would 
have to be collected. All 
cloven-hoofed animals (both 
domestic and wild) within the 
affected area would have to 
be destroyed and disposed 
of. A full-scale criminal inves­
tigation would have to be 
launched, including the identi­
fication, apprehension, and 
prosecution of suspects. 
Preventing an Attack 
Because terrorists rely on a 
lack of preparedness, law 
enforcement agencies should 
start now to develop a plan 
for preventing an agroterror­
ism attack—and the interrup­
tion of basic services, civil 
and emotional stress, and 
public health concerns that 
In May 2006, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) held a regional 
planning meeting on preventing and responding to a bioterrorism attack 
American agriculture from bioterrorism—brought together key law 
enforcement, animal health, and homeland security officials from nine 
Midwestern States. 
attack and discussed ways to improve the response, should an attack 
enforcement and veterinary and animal health authorities, within the 
State and across State borders. 
on the Nation’s agriculture industry. The meeting—which grew out of 
NIJ’s research on defining the role of law enforcement in protecting 
Officials rated their State’s preparedness in preventing an agroterrorism 
occur. One of the most vital topics concerned coordination among law 
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likely would follow. On the local 
level, law enforcement agencies 
bear a responsibility for intelli­
gence gathering, including the 
review of Federal reports on 
bioterrorism threats. For exam­
ple, in an effort to minimize the 
potential of an epidemic, the 
World Organization on Animal 
Health coordinates information 
on animal diseases (see www. 
oie.int). Local jurisdictions are 
also in the best position to con­
duct vulnerability studies of 
area farms and feedlots. 
Specialized training for law 
enforcement is needed. 
Joint planning and opera­
tional exercises also must 
take place for agencies 
to be ready to respond to 
such a crime, if it occurs. 
Partnerships—the best way 
to prevent an agroterrorism 
attack and the only way 
to contain one—must be 
created among local farmers, 
truckers, feedlot owners, and 
other critical members of the 
food-supply chain. A working 
relationship between criminal 
investigators and veterinari­
ans and animal and plant 
health inspectors must be 
established. 
A New Security 
Paradigm 
The paradigm for protecting 
the Nation’s food supply 
changed after 9/11, focus­
ing attention on areas that 
require greater security mea­
sures. Research funded by 
NIJ recommends that, to pro­
tect the Nation’s 2.1 million 
farms, the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture (USDA), the 
U.S. Department of Home­
land Security (DHS),  and 
other intelligence-gathering 
The Ford County Sheriff’s Department in Dodge City, Kansas, in collabo­
ration with the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, developed a neighbor­
hood watch/community policing program called Agro-Guard. Law 
enforcement and livestock producers participate in the program in an 
effort to identify threats to agriculture before they become incidents. 
Agro-Guard participation involves reporting suspicious activity, posting 
warning signs, holding community meetings on law enforcement and 
animal health issues, creating a public-access Web site, and develop­
ing emergency response procedures. 
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agencies work with local and 
State law enforcement and 
the livestock industry to 
develop a national plan to 
prevent, respond to, and 
ultimately recover from an 
incident of agroterrorism. 
Notes 
1. See Economic Impact of 
a Foreign Animal Disease 
(FAD) Outbreak Across the 
United States, U.S. Depart­
ment of Agriculture, Wash­
ington, DC, 2004. 
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Jaax, J. (2002, August 20). 
Sworn Testimony: How 
effectively is the federal 
government assisting state 
and local governments in 
preparing for a biological, 
chemical, or nuclear attack? 
Congressional field hearing, 
House Committee on Gov­
ernment Reform, Abilene, KS 
(http://frwebgate.access. 
gpo.gov/cgi-bin/useftp. 
cgi?IPadress=162.140.64.88 
&filename=88193.wais&direc 
tory=/diskc/wais/data/107_ 
house_hearings). 
RAND. (2003). Agroterrorism: 
What is the threat and what 
can be done about it? Santa 
Monica, CA: National 
Defense Research Institute. 
Waters, A. (2005, May 3). 
Foot and mouth disease out­
break in Great Britain: A case 
study. Formal presentation, 
International Symposium on 
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MO (www.fbi-isa.org/library/ 
Waters_files/frame.htm). 
The researchers’ recommendations for strengthening America’s 
defense against agroterrorism include: 
■	 Development of a national law enforcement plan, including 
Federal funding of preventive measures to be developed by local 
law enforcement. 
■	 Intelligence-gathering by local law enforcement, including com­
munity policing in conjunction with the agriculture industry. 
■	 Training, at the regional level, of local law enforcement personnel 
to enforce stop-movement orders and quarantine areas in the 
event of an attack. 
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The National Institute of Justice is the 
research, development, and evaluation 
agency of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
NIJ’s mission is to advance scientific research, 
development, and evaluation to enhance the 
administration of justice and public safety. 
Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are 
those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official 
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This research was supported by the National Institute of 
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